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Nicholas J. White, J.M. Barwise and Shakila Yacob 
 
Abstract:  
The importance of Malaya’s iron ore has been downgraded from both an economic 
and geo-strategic perspective. Under colonial administration, iron ore mines owned 
and operated by Japanese enterprises and individuals, and the resultant exports to 
Japan, were central to economic development in the east-coast states of the 
peninsula.  But this also made British Malaya a site of international contestation as 
Anglo-Japanese relations became estranged in the run up to World War Two in Asia 
and the Pacific. British administrators had to balance economic opportunity with 
strategic cost, and securing iron ore was a key factor in Japan’s occupation of Malaya 
after December 1941. Pre-war dilemmas resurfaced after the Pacific War. 
Nevertheless, exports to Japan both resumed and expanded. The combination of 
Japanese regeneration and Southeast Asian development in the context of the Cold 
War once again placed Malaya’s iron ore at the centre of geo-strategic and economic 
priorities for what was fast becoming the terminal colonial regime. This analysis is 
supported by the wide range of primary sources consulted from the records of the 
Malayan state administrations to British intelligence assessments, as well as the 
evaluation of quantitative data.    
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The ‘Land flowing with Milk and Honey’, the ‘Golden Chersonese’, and the ‘Lucky 
Country’ are well-known epithets attributed to twentieth-century Malaya (today’s 
peninsular or West Malaysia) given the peninsula’s abundant supplies of rubber, tin 
and palm oil. Less appreciated is that the Malay States were significant producers of 
iron ore from the 1920s to the 1970s, and iron mining was a major contributor to 
economic growth in the poorer east coast. Because these mines were initially 
exploited by Japanese capital and personnel (largely for consumption in Japan), this 
article demonstrates that Malaya became a site of international contestation as 
Anglo-Japanese estrangement intensified during the 1930s. Iron ore played a central 
role in the plans for Japan’s occupation of Southeast Asia after 1941. Moreover, 
despite the British colonial administration carefully controlling Japanese 
participation in iron mining after World War Two, Malaya achieved a new strategic 
importance as a non-communist source of a key raw material for the reconstruction 
of Japan in the context of the Asian Cold War.   
 
In their colonial responsibilities for the Malay Peninsula, British officials (on the spot 
and in London) balanced economic opportunity with strategic dilemma in the 
growth of iron-ore mining (both before and after the Pacific War). In unravelling that 
complex interplay, this article challenges the existing historiography which has 
downgraded iron ore in Malaya’s economic and international history. Drabble’s 
survey of Malaysia’s modern economy, for example, devotes only two paragraphs to 
the industry, dismissing it as lacking in ‘prime importance’. 1 This overlooks the 
significance of wealth generation for the east coast, and the growing dependence of 
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Japan upon these resources. Kratoska’s study of the Japanese Occupation underplays 
the strategic importance of iron ore, and mistakenly classifies Malaya’s metal as ‘low 
grade’ (and hence of limited value).2 For the post-1945 period, Rotter’s study of the 
‘triangular’ origins of Washington’s containment policy in Southeast Asia focuses on 
Malaya’s value as a US dollar earner from rubber and tin for British recovery rather 
than the peninsula’s position as a supplier of raw materials for anti-communist, 
intra-Asian rejuvenation.3   
 
Business and international historians have resurrected the role of strategic raw 
materials, especially metals, in twentieth-century diplomacy and global conflict. This 
has extended to the Cold War era, and the growing interest of the US in the supply 
potential of the decolonising developing world.4 Nevertheless, Malaya’s iron ore has 
not received attention in this literature.  Brown’s brief discussion is set within the 
parameters of the business history of Southeast Asia, and does not consider iron ore 
as a strategic metal.5  Yuen and Tomaru focus on the pre- and post-war period 
respectively and consideration of the subtle continuities between the two eras is 
therefore lacking in both their works.6  This article is also a considerable 
development on the existing literature because of the wide range of previously un-
mined sources employed.  For example, Tomaru did not use the records of the state 
and federal governments in Malaysia (which have been extensively drawn upon in 
the present study). Meanwhile, Aldrich and Best, in their studies of British 
intelligence in the run up to the Pacific War, could not link Japanese espionage and 
Malayan iron mining, and the interplay of economic and strategic issues in the mid-
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1930s, because they did not have access to recently-declassified security service 
papers at the UK’s National Archives.7 As such, the originality of this article is 
further enhanced by going beyond a ‘domestic’ history of Malaya’s iron ore through 
addressing the wider, transnational economic and geo-political factors in the 
industry’s development.  
 
The hidden abundance and importance of Malayan iron ore 
 
Before considering the strategic dilemma that confronted Britain in the 1930s, the 
article begins by assessing the growth and significance of iron mining for both 
Malaya’s and Japan’s economic development. The dominance of tin has obscured the 
significance of iron-ore extraction in Malayan mining.8 Iron ore accounted for six per 
cent of the value obtained from tin before World War Two.9 Yet, iron-ore 
exploitation was a critical source of revenue in the states of Johor, Terengganu and 
Kelantan which, with Kedah and Perlis, made up the Unfederated Malay States 
(UMS).  These were the sultanates which maintained a higher degree of autonomy 
and only accepted British advisers in the early-twentieth century. Perak, Selangor, 
Negeri Sembilan and Pahang, where plantation agriculture and tin-mining 
concentrated, were brought together as the Federated Malay States (FMS) in 1896. 
The UMS, like the FMS, were ‘protected states’, ceding authority to Britain in 
external and defence matters and treaty-bound to accept British ‘advice’. But the 
UMS stayed outside the federal structure. Only in the FMS was there a centralised 
administration overseen by British officials in Kuala Lumpur. Even there, however, 
the individual states retained considerable autonomy in local affairs. British direct 
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rule existed only in the crown colonies of Penang, Melaka and Singapore, 
collectively governed as the Straits Settlements (SS). 
 
In the loosely-controlled UMS, the export of iron ore was the second biggest source 
of income for Johor by 1931, and the top earner for Terengganu in 1934. Income from 
iron ore comfortably surpassed earnings from tin and gold in Kelantan by 1937, 
providing 17 per cent of the state’s revenue.10  In the absence of a central budget for 
British-protected Malaya, public spending in the UMS was dependent upon locally-
imposed fees for concessions, leasehold payments, and royalties on exports. Revenue 
and expenditure was significantly lower (between a quarter and one-third) in the 
peasant-based economies of Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu compared with the 
richer FMS and SS.11 Even in Johor, with extensive rubber plantations, iron mining 
was regarded very favourably by state administrators. The Japanese mining 
company, Ishihara Sangyo Koshi (ISK), was allowed to open a port at the mouth of 
the Batu Pahat River. Bypassing Singapore, this harnessed extra export revenue for 
Johor through direct shipments to Japan. Within its first year of operation after 1921, 
export duty from ISK’s venture netted Johor over M$73,000.12 Symbolically, the 
mine’s name was changed from Batu Medan to Sri Medan (from ‘stone field’ to 
‘splendid field’).13 Rates of around 10 per cent ad valorem (40 to 50 cents per ton) 
were charged on iron ore exports by the early-1930s.14 A Colonial Office (CO) 
mandarin appreciated that these duties were not ‘at all low’. Tin exports were 
charged just 6 per cent ad valorem in the FMS. The UMS administrations were 
getting a good screw out of the Japanese.15 ‘[A]nticipating great returns’ in 
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November 1935, Kelantan’s British Adviser ‘made explicitly clear to his subordinates 
that no obstruction should be placed in the way of the Japanese and that every co-
operation should be given to them’.16 On the opening of the Temangan mine in 1937, 
a District Officer raved that ‘a vista of mining wealth... may well bring Kelantan to a 
foremost position among the Malay States’.17 On top of export duties, there was the 
bounty from the indirect revenues through levies on ships, lighters, tugs, and petrol 
plus tobacco and liquor consumed by the ‘coolies’.18   
 
There were also far-reaching employment benefits. The Bukit Besi mining complex 
in Terengganu employed over 4,800 labourers by 1938, while the workforce 
numbered nearly 1,000 at Kemaman (also in Terengganu). At the end of 1940, there 
were over 650 workers at the Temangan mine in Kelantan.19 Malay coconut farmers 
on the West Johor coastline, facing declining yields during the 1930s, found 
recompense in employment in the iron and bauxite mines, ‘on the back of rising 
mineral extraction (and mining wages)’.20 Labour was also required to construct 
roads, railways and ports. Additional to this transport infrastructure, the mines 
provided a modern social nexus of schools, hospitals and housing.21 Viewed through 
the lens of the UMS, rather than the peninsula as a whole, the significance of iron-ore 
mining is greatly magnified. 
 
Why was it left to Japanese entrepreneurs to develop the industry? The UMS lacked 
British investment, which focussed on the western Malay states and upon rubber 
and tin. The latter used a different technology - dredging rather than quarrying, 
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open-cast and underground mining in the case of iron.22 Iron-mining passed under 
Britain’s radar because the Japanese were not in direct competition with vested 
imperial interests.23 Nor could British enterprises find a domestic or Empire-
Commonwealth market for Malaya’s iron, primarily because of uneconomic 
shipping costs and also because the UK iron and steel industry had a plentiful 
supply of high-grade ore, supplemented by pig iron from India. Nor was processing 
‘on the spot’ practicable, given a lack of coking coal, and a disinclination in colonial 
policy to encourage manufacturing for fear of denying home industries markets, and 
affecting hard-currency earnings from primary production.24  Through piggy-
backing on Japanese business networks, British Malaya gained directly from tax 
revenues and indirectly through economic development without investment risks, 
capital outlay, or marketing headaches.  
   
Powerful ‘pull’ factors drew Japanese enterprises to Malaya’s iron ore. Relative to 
Japan’s poor finds in its colonial and semi-colonial stakes in Korea, Taiwan and 
Manchuria, and the resource-poor home economy, Malaya’s iron-ore grading was 
high.25 The Batu Medan discovery received a glowing endorsement from a Japanese 
engineer in March 1920: the ore was of ‘excellent quality’, and ‘an equal source could 
hardly be found elsewhere’.26 The head of the FMS Geological Survey concluded in 
1933 that Johor’s iron ore was of ‘the very first quality’ with bulk-assays of haematite 
revealing 64 per cent metallic iron.27 The limonite at Temangan was less impressive 
with 50-54 per cent iron content.28 But Terengganu’s ore was rated ‘first class’ after 
the Second World War by British experts.29 A study of the peninsula’s geography in 
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the early-1960s reported that the percentage of iron content in Malaya’s ores varied 
from 50 in the case of Kedah to 68 for Perak. The largest known deposits at Rompin 
in Pahang contained 56-66 per cent Fe content, confirming pre-war surveys which 
believed the majority of the ore to be ‘high grade’.30 Under contemporary grading 
systems, this would place Malaya’s ore in a variety of bands: 52-58 per cent Fe is 
‘low’; 62-63.5 per cent ‘medium’; 65 per cent or above ‘high’.31 Malaya’s iron ore was 
hardly the last resort that Kratoska suggested.  
 
Moreover, iron mining in Malaya ‘followed closely the development of Japan’s steel 
industry’, which more than doubled in size during the 1930s.32 Reliance on home 
production would have been foolhardy since, at 1930s consumption levels, all 
Japan’s iron ore reserves were expected to be depleted within fifty years. Estimates 
of Japan’s domestic iron ore reserves varied from 40 to 80 million tons, where ‘even 
the higher figure [was] equal to little more than the amount of ore actually mined in 
the United States in a single year’.33  To protect domestic iron-ore reserves which, in 
the face of an international crisis would become even more crucial, 80 per cent of 
Japan’s domestic mining concerns were under conservation by 1936 and the country 
imported more than six and half times the iron mined at home.34 China had been 
Japan’s first overseas call for iron ore. But, with the opening of mines in the UMS, 
Malaya superseded China as Japan’s number one supplier by the early-1930s when 
the peninsula was providing 60 per cent of Japan’s requirements (See Figure 1).   
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Figure 1: Imports of Iron Ore from Malaya, China and Philippines to Japan by percentage of 
total  
 
Source: Bunji, Steel, 3, Table 1; Erselcuk, ‘Iron and Steel’, 114-5; Tomaru, 
Rapprochement, 26.  
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Chinese interior.35 As early as 1928, just one mine in Johor was furnishing 40 per cent 
of the total ferrous raw materials consumed by Japan.36   
 
Four firms came to dominate Malayan iron-ore production from the 1920s.  ISK was 
the pioneer in Johor, followed by exploitation at Kemaman in Terengganu from 
1928. The Nippon Kogyo Koshi (NKK; the Nippon Mining Company) entered soon 
after.  From 1930, NKK’s Bukit Besi mine became the most productive of all Malaya’s 
iron-ore outlets. By 1933, Bukit Besi employed a Japanese technical and managerial 
staff of 60. The mine reached a production level of over 1.1 million tons in 1937.37 
Tekko KK (in Johor and Kelantan) and Kokan Kogyo (Southern Mining Company in 
Kelantan) were the other major players. Smaller mining concerns existed (in Kedah 
and Perak for example). These were ‘almost without exception’ affiliated to Japanese 
enterprises.38 On top of vicinity to Japan, vis-à-vis supplies from Europe, North 
America and India, and comparatively low production costs, economies were also 
reaped for these companies through bringing coal to Malaya in Japanese ships which 
returned home loaded with ore.  This, combined with Japanese ownership of the 
mines, made it unnecessary to expend foreign exchange as was the case with Japan’s 
tin and rubber purchases.39 Another bonus for the Japanese miners was large 
quantities of manganese, also of ‘first class importance in the manufacture of steel’ 
and ‘very little’ being ‘mined in Japan proper’, found close to the Kelantan and 
Terengganu iron mines.40 Between 1934 and 1938 alone, Malaya’s manganese 
exports increased nearly 42 per cent from 18,650 to 31,970 tons.41   
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Given these geo-strategic and financial benefits, Japanese mining interests in Malaya 
enjoyed close links with government, financial institutions, and shipping and steel 
interests in Japan. After the discovery of the Batu Medan mine, ISK worked in 
tandem with the Yawata steel works in Kyushu.  Government-run to 1934 (and 
heavily influenced by the Japanese state thereafter), Yawata rewarded the Ishihara 
brothers with an exclusive contract to supply iron ore for its blast furnaces (which 
produced over half of Japan’s domestic pig-iron and steel output from its inception 
in 1901 through to the 1930s).42 Likewise, NKK, a subsidiary of Tokyo’s ‘wealthy and 
powerful’ Kuhara Mining Company, had the ‘whole’ of its output from Bukit Besi 
‘absorbed by the Yawata works’.43 Although ISK developed its own steamship fleet, 
in the early years vessels were chartered from Yamashita and Mitsubishi (which the 
Special Branch of the police in Singapore called the ‘foster-parents’ of ISK).44 It was 
also believed by the security services that ISK’s chief executive, Ishihara Hirochiro, 
secured loans from the Japanese government through his connections with the 
Seiyukai party, which favoured the interests of big business and state involvement in 
industry. The Kawasaki Dockyards and the government-owned Bank of Taiwan 
backed ISK financially.45 Kokan Kogyo, with a capital of one million yen floated in 
Tokyo, was a subsidiary of Japan Steel Tubing, which held 80 per cent of the mining 
company’s equity.46 Malayan iron-mining concerns were integral, therefore, to a 
business and government network as ‘part of [Japan’s] clear strategy of reducing 
dependence on the world market for essential imports, substituting through 
Japanese private enterprise overseas’.47 For Special Branch, the ‘great financial 
success’ of the Ishihara enterprises was ‘doubtless with the aid of large subsidies 
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from the Japanese Government’. Back in 1917, the Japanese individual who obtained 
the lease that would become the Bukit Besi mine was believed to be ‘an agent of the 
Japanese Government’.48  
 
A symbiosis developed between British colonialism and Japanese industrialisation 
through Malaya’s iron ore. The revenues of the UMS increased and infrastructure 
was developed, labour found regular employment, Japanese industry sourced raw 
materials and the mining entrepreneurs enjoyed good returns. Yet, by the 1930s, 
economic opportunity was accompanied by a strategic dilemma in this reciprocal 
dependence. Britain found itself between a rock and a hard place. The strategic raw 
material was vital for the Japanese steel industry which, in turn, provided the 
backbone for the Japanese military machine. To continue to supply Japan with iron 
ore necessarily equipped the Japanese with the means to forcibly grab the metal, 
should the need arise. On the other hand, blocking supplies would deprive the UMS 
of wealth-creation opportunities while also making it increasingly likely that the 
Japanese would resort to military means in order to secure the much-coveted metal.  
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The 1930s: strategic dilemma versus business as usual 
 
The strategic issue was not a major problem when the initial mining concessions in 
Johor and Terengganu were awarded to Japanese interests.  The ‘Two Island 
Empires’ were allies to 1923.  Nevertheless, Japan was becoming increasingly 
estranged from the Empire-Commonwealth, following Tokyo’s resentment at the 
failure to include a racial equality clause in the Treaty of Versailles, and the 
country’s disappointing allocations in the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922. Anglo-
Japanese tensions were further heightened by the occupation of Manchuria in 1931 
(and the subsequent bombing of Shanghai in 1932). This was followed by the 
withdrawal of Japan from naval limitation talks in 1936 and the Japanese invasion of 
rump China in 1937 (threatening Britain’s interests along the Yangtze valley).  
Moreover, Imperial Japan increasingly aligned itself with Nazi Germany and Fascist 
Italy through the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936, and the full-blown Axis alliance of 
1940. Simultaneously, Japan became dependent on Malayan iron ore. The steady 
increase in production directly reflected the militarisation of both Japanese industry 
and governance: ‘military build-up and the resultant expansion of heavy industries 
tremendously increased demand for natural resources, particularly minerals’.49 As a 
British colonial geologist put it in 1941, iron-ore, manganese and bauxite mining 
produced ‘welcome sources of revenue to the east coast states’ but they had to be 
‘regarded with mixed feelings’. They also represented ‘important sources of supply 
for the armaments of Japan’.50  
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It might seem perplexing, therefore, that to 1940 minimal restrictions were placed on 
Malaya’s iron ore exports. The only limitation on supplies reaching Japan arose from 
the availability of labour and shipping.51 Strikes during 1937 and 1938 in Johor and 
Terengganu by Chinese coolies, protesting at Japan’s occupation of their 
motherland, did lead to a dip in production. But the Chinese were replaced by a 
combination of Japanese fishermen, and Tamil, Malay and Indonesian workers.  
Production at Bukit Besi actually increased through maintaining extraction during 
the monsoon season, and stockpiling the ore until shipping could be resumed.52 For 
1939, iron exports to Japan from the Malay States reached a new peak of over 1.9 
million tons; a gain of nearly 27 per cent over 1938 and 20 per cent over 1936’s 
previous record output.53  Production at Temangan more than quadrupled between 
1937 and 1940 alone, from around 49,000 to 226,000 tons – the only restriction on 
exports was a complex transportation system for the ore involving an aerial ropeway 
from the isolated mine to the railway at Bukit Besi.54 In step with this upsurge in 
Japanese mining activity throughout the 1930s, the Japanese population of 
Terengganu grew nearly 58 per cent from 330 in 1931 to 520 in 1939.55   
 
One reason for this ‘laissez-faire’ attitude lay in the chaotic nature of British rule in 
the peninsula, and the large degree of discretion afforded to the individual UMS 
administrations in the alienation of land.  The all-controlling British ‘overlord’ 
existed in myth only.  In Kratoska’s apt phrase, ‘Britain ruled Malaya by sufferance, 
not by fiat’. Lacking capacity, the administration could not ‘shape and manipulate 
the economy’.56 British ‘indirect rule’ entailed negotiation and compromise with 
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Malay elites. In particular, land remained vested in the sultans and rajahs, and 
alienation decisions were the preserve of the ‘Ruler-in-Council’.57 The government of 
Johor, not the High Commissioner for the Malay States/Governor of the Straits 
Settlements, nor the CO in London, awarded the Batu Medan concession to 
Ishihara.58 Local rulers jealously guarded these rights not only as a means of 
generating revenue, but also as a means of maintaining autonomy.59 At the same 
time, the British were at pains to ensure that this arrangement continued, with the 
‘maintenance of the position of the Malay rulers…a cardinal point of British 
policy’.60 The Bukit Besi lease in Terengganu reached Japanese interests by a 
circuitous route, without central mediation: in 1917, a Chinese speculator, Wong Sin, 
sold his mining rights with a payment of M$50,000. Wong Sin had been awarded the 
lease by a member of the Terengganu royal family, Tengku Abu Bakar, (who, in 
turn, had been granted land by the Sultan).61 Furthermore, in the course of 1917, 
Wong Sin’s concession was transferred from one Japanese purchaser to another. 
These complex deals only came to regional and imperial attention in Singapore and 
London during 1935 as a consequence of Special Branch delving into the confidential 
files of Terengganu’s British Adviser (which also revealed that the legality of the 
original grant or ‘chop’ was ‘open to question at the time owing to the wide powers 
conferred’).62  
 
Even so, land alienation to Japanese companies continued.  In September 1936, the 
Terengganu government, including the British Adviser, was happy to lease 
additional land to NKK to extend its railway line from its jetties at Nibong on the 
17 | P a g e  
 
Dungun River to a new port at Sura on the coast. None of this decision-making 
seems to have been referred to the colonial administration beyond Terengganu.63 
This ‘hands off’ policy was strongly defended in Whitehall. A CO mandarin pointed 
out that the ‘Protected States [would] not stand for exploitation in the interests of 
British industrialists’.64 In December 1937, despite Japan’s invasion of China’s 
eastern seaboard five months earlier, Southern Mining was awarded a further 14-
acre lease for 21 years at Temangan in Kelantan.65  
 
This is not to say that the ‘central’ colonial administration in Singapore or 
metropolitan officials in Whitehall were disinterested in Japanese activities.  The 
High Commissioner called for a ‘confidential report on iron mining by Japanese in 
Malaya’ in 1933.66  When Sir Cecil Clementi forwarded the findings to London, the 
High Commissioner suggested that the document be studied by the War Office 
(WO), Admiralty and Air Ministry, as well as the CO, since the mines employed 
‘large quantities of explosives by aliens and in practice this is very difficult to 
control’.67 While primarily concerned with the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), 
with more resources and manpower directed towards spying on its supporters, 
Singapore’s Special Branch had become significantly concerned with the activities of 
Japanese individuals and enterprises in Malaya to warrant the creation of the Japan 
Section in 1933.68 The espionage case of 1934 intensified geo-strategic angst. Kokubu 
Kiromichi, a Japanese metal engraver resident in Singapore, attempted to obtain 
military secrets from personnel connected to the Royal Air Force. Kokubu was in 
league with two further Japanese individuals who had arrived in the peninsula in 
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November 1934.When the conspiracy was uncovered by Special Branch, it was 
ascertained that one of the visitors was actually Lieutenant Commander Kaseda 
Tetsuhiko of the Japanese Navy. Kaseda claimed to be an employee of ISK and his 
accommodation was arranged by Y. Nishimura, the managing director of ISK in 
Malaya. Under questioning, Kaseda confessed that the purpose of the visit to Malaya 
was to obtain official secrets.69 Before similar interrogation, Nishimura committed 
suicide by swallowing a strychnine capsule. Special Branch’s inkling that Nishimura 
was financing Kokubo and his colleagues was confirmed by intercepted telegrams 
from the Japanese Consul-General in Singapore to Tokyo.70  
 
Banishment orders were issued for the two Japanese visitors, as well as Kokubo and 
another Japanese Singapore resident.  But the ‘bigger picture’ worked against any 
curtailing of Japanese exports or employment restrictions. The affair was hushed up 
because the British imperial government did not wish to rock the boat. The wider 
context was the naval negotiations taking place between Britain, the US and Japan in 
London.  Britain’s principal concern was to prevent the enlargement of the Japanese 
navy, while the Japanese sought parity.71 British officials and ministers hoped for a 
‘diplomatic escape’ from a ‘strategic reality’ designed to avoid ‘full-scale air and 
naval rearmament’.72  
 
The possibility of a Japanese army-in-waiting was dismissed by the CO in March 
1937. The Japanese expats were by-and-large genuine engineers and supervisors and 
they were insufficient in number to constitute a major threat.73 Nonetheless, in the 
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light of the exposure of Singapore with Japan’s refusal to sign the London Naval 
Treaty in March 1936, and the Japanese Navy pushing ahead with expansion, a 
decision was taken to prevent ‘further alienations to the Japanese for mining without 
the permission of the military’.74 Iron and bauxite mining by Nissa Shokai in Johor 
was suspended during 1937 because the mine was located in an ‘area of peculiar air 
and naval importance’.75 Nevertheless, restrictions continued to be balanced with a 
desire not to push the Japanese too far, or to kill the goose laying the golden eggs in 
the UMS. There was a ban in the FMS on the export of scrap iron, but ‘revenue 
considerations’ permitted the other Japanese mines to continue operating.  In 
February 1941, an extra export duty of 2.5 per cent ad valorem was imposed on iron 
ore.  But this was a ‘revenue-producing measure’ rather than an attempt to 
discourage exports.76 Southern Mining was even given dispensation to import 
oxygen bottles (potentially highly inflammable) in September 1940 given production 
from which Kelantan ‘derive[d] revenue’.77     
 
After the Japanese invasion of China, economic sanctions against Japan, involving 
halting raw material supplies, were held back by inter-departmental wrangling in 
Whitehall encompassing the CO, the Foreign Office (FO), the Board of Trade (BoT) 
and the Treasury.78  In this, there were compelling arguments which favoured 
accommodation with Japan. Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, supported by the 
Treasury, Admiralty and WO, wished to avoid a war on two fronts given European 
tensions and an unreliable US administration.79  With Washington trying to avoid 
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alliances and deescalate tensions, a sudden restriction of iron-ore exports might only 
benefit the American-occupied Philippines.80  
 
This strategy could be seen as a continuation of British economic ‘appeasement’ 
which, after the occupation of Manchuria, Kibata argues sought to establish imperial 
coexistence with Japan.81 Best disagrees, however, citing quotas on Japanese textile 
imports to Malaya after 1934 which heightened tensions.82 But Malayan iron ore was 
a different case. It lacked a politically-powerful industrial voice in Britain, compared 
to the Lancashire cotton mills. In this regard, Britain’s stance on iron ore was more 
akin to commodity policy towards Nazi Germany in the 1930s designed to continue 
trade and reduce antagonism through maintaining dependencies.  The ‘time to 
engage in economic warfare was at the outbreak of war, not before’.83 As a CO 
mandarin noted in March 1937, it was:  
 
infinitely preferable that the Japanese should spend their capital on 
developing these mines in Malaya and make themselves dependent on 
supplies from this source, which would be immediately cut off in the 
event of war, than they should develop resources in North China or 
Manchuria from which they could not be so cut off.84  
 
This position resonated in the US. In weighing the strategic dilemma against economic 
opportunity, the Americans were minded to avoid a situation which would allow 
Japan to ‘reduce its economic dependence on the United States’.85 
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In avoiding war with Japan, the situation was complicated by the outbreak of 
conflict in Europe from September 1939. An export licensing system was introduced 
by the Malayan governments.86 Yet, the British Ambassador in Tokyo, the BoT, the 
Treasury, the FO, the CO and the Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW) continued to 
squabble over the necessity for further restrictions.87 On the one hand, the MEW 
sought restrictions as key to its policy to prevent strategic raw materials reaching 
Axis powers.88  It was supported by the BoT and Treasury, though in their case to 
avoid a new Anglo-Japanese trade agreement that might require Britain to purchase 
unnecessary Japanese goods.89 Nevertheless, while attitudes had hardened by 
autumn 1940, the FO-CO consensus continued to ensure shipments of iron ore to 
Japan. Concerns about Japanese intentions towards Southeast Asia, through the 
military occupation of Indo-China in September, were compounded in the following 
month by a tour of Borneo by a Japanese consul, sizing up the oil potential of the 
British-protected territories. Yet, there was a concurrent appreciation that ‘too severe 
a policy of sanctions [might] only provoke Japan into launching an offensive against 
largely undefended South-East Asia in order to seize the region’s raw materials’.90 In 
June 1941, Rab Butler, a junior minister at the FO, with a reputation for 
appeasement, argued that restriction of Terengganu’s exports ‘would produce a 
maximum of tension in our relations with Japan with a minimum of useful result’.91  
 
Even so, the British intelligence image of Japan as a ‘cautious power’, led to ‘tightening 
economic sanctions’; a ‘containment’ policy, in which the screw was gradually 
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tightened up, ‘designed to gain time and to weaken Japan’.92 This meant that the 
concerns of the governor of the SS about Singapore’s vulnerability and the economic 
destabilisation of the UMS began to be overridden.93 In March 1941, Singapore was 
told by London that existing quotas, whereby iron-ore exports were kept to the 
average prevailing before the outbreak of war in Europe, could not be raised.94 A 
further reduction in shipments eventuated in July 1941 given restrictions placed on 
night loading, potentially cutting annual exports by half.95 With Butler moved to 
Education, the FO took a more confrontational stance arguing that a denial strategy 
would make Japan ‘hesitate before deciding on war’. This followed the extension of 
US export controls of raw materials to the Philippines at the end of May.96 
Nevertheless, some concessions were given to the Japanese miners in late-July after a 
‘freezing order’ on financial transactions was feared likely to have ‘very unfortunate’ 
consequences for local labour through the non-payment of wages.97  
 
This was, after all, at a time when central directives for the colonial empire stressed 
that ‘the right use of resources’, in line with the sacrifices being made in the UK, 
should not be at the expense of ‘large populations... whose standard of living is now 
so low that the same policy cannot and should not be applied to them, even in 
wartime’.98 The context was the Colonial Development & Welfare Act of 1940 
designed to placate colonial populations, as well as undercut US and Axis critiques of 
British imperialism, following a wave of labour unrest which engulfed the tropical 
empire in the 1930s.99 This included the mines, plantations and ports of Malaya where 
there was a series of strikes, riots and looting from 1936 involving the MCP as well as 
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Indian nationalist groups (spurred on by Nehru’s visit to Malaya during 1937).100 
Between 1936 and 1939, the number of working days estimated lost due to strikes 
totalled over 1.1 million.101 Economic opportunity continued to trump strategic 
dilemma, therefore, and a Philippines-style blanket ban on iron-ore exports to Japan 
was out of the question. The MEW explained to the British embassy in Washington 
that further restrictions might be interpreted by Tokyo as ‘unjustified and provocative’ 
but would also ‘create local economic and financial problems’.102  
 
By 1941, British diplomats in Japan were calling for curtailment of shipments of 
strategic materials, which would teach anti-British elements in Japan ‘a useful 
lesson’.  The excess of Malaya’s iron ore could be used for British war needs or found 
an outlet in another neutral market.103 But where was the alternative market? India’s 
industrialisation remained insufficient to absorb large quantities. Processing 
Malayan ore in Australia was considered ‘uneconomic’.104 A ‘dog-in-the-manger 
policy’, as an American commentator appreciated, would ‘only antagonize Japan 
pointlessly in order to secure for British interests an unwanted monopoly’.105 This 
often conflicting interplay between strategic dilemma and economic opportunity 
meant that it was only in August 1941 that Whitehall could claim that Malaya was 
no longer supplying Japan’s munitions industry.106  At the end of May, cement for 
the extension of Kokan Kogyo’s wharf was requisitioned for emergency Air Raid 
Precaution purposes.107 Further ‘defence measures’ in July provided ‘an additional 
restriction’ on the Kelantan mine’s exports. The issue of a mining lease to ISK at 
Rompin in Pahang was also withheld and the Japanese prospectors in the area 
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withdrew.108 A steady flow of Japanese left Malaya in autumn 1941, some aboard the 
Japanese government’s official repatriation ship in October.109 Nonetheless, it was 
only at the end of November that ISK closed its Batu Pahat office. As such, 
substantial iron-ore stockpiles awaited Japan’s invasion of the peninsula in 
December.110   
 
Ironed Out: the Japanese Occupation 
 
According to Kratoska, the notion that ‘Japan conquered Malaya to obtain the 
peninsula’s rich resources’ is a ‘misconception’. Rather, Malaya provided a stepping-
stone to the oil fields of Sumatra and Borneo. The peninsula, ‘played almost no role in 
supplying raw materials because, with the exception of bauxite, [Malaya] produced 
very little that Japan needed to prosecute the war’.111 Johor’s mines only managed to 
yield around 17 per cent of Japan’s bauxite imports throughout the Occupation with 
the bulk of these supplies being sourced from the Indonesian island of Bintan. Rubber 
was produced in Malaya on a scale far exceeding Japan’s war needs, while the 
peninsula’s tin production was effectively neutralised in British scorched-earth tactics 
which crippled the dredges. Though crucial for Japanese steel, even Malaya’s iron ore 
failed to live up to its pre-war potential (see Table 1).  
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Table 1: Iron Ore Production in Malaya, 1941-5 
 
Year Total Output 






Source: Federation of Malaya Annual Report 1948, 68 
 
The lack of resource exploitation might suggest that Malaya’s importance to Japan 
lay in geo-strategy, through controlling shipping and denying the enemy. This 
represents a retrospective reading, which overlooks the intense Japanese interest in 
the peninsula’s strategic metals in forging their Occupation plans. The significance of 
tin as war matériel in the production of automobiles, for example, is often forgotten. 
While substitutes for tin were available in the 1930s and 1940s, readjustments to 
production methods were so costly that ‘no belligerent nation would willingly 
forego the use of tin’. Indeed, the Japanese case demonstrated ‘that an increased use 
of tin results from modern warfare’. Japan’s consumption of the metal rose from 
4,700 to 11,000 long tons annually in the decade after 1929. Moreover, tin was 
extensively stockpiled by Japan from the late-1930s as the spectre of war loomed.112 
Concurrently, ‘no bauxite sources existed within Japan’s “Inner Zone”’, and bauxite 
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was the key component in the production of aluminium which was crucial for 
aircraft construction.113  
 
In the case of iron ore, meanwhile, American analyst Patricia Barnett concluded in 
the summer of 1940 that ‘both political and economic factors lead us to anticipate 
greater, rather than less, dependence [on Southeast Asia]’.114 Iron and steel 
production and consumption in Japan came under the control of the military-led 
government by late-1937. In December of that year, the Planning Board’s greatest 
concern was ‘a shortage of steel’.115 By 1941, when steel was one of six crucial 
industries under a control association, it is reckoned that nearly half of Japanese steel 
was allocated to the military, with a substantial slice consumed by the shipbuilding 
industry.116  However, the Japanese military was so disappointed with the Planning 
Board’s steel allocations for 1941-42, that several of the Board’s members were 
arrested on charges of communism.117 Moreover, as an FO mandarin unwittingly 
emphasised in July 1941, Japan’s shortage of iron and manganese could not be 
alleviated by ‘greater control over Indo-China’, which had only produced 1,158 tons 
for Japan in 1936, compared to the 3 million tons of annual combined exports from 
Malaya and the Philippines by 1939.118 The Japanese agreed. Suzuki Teiichi, heading 
the Planning Board in 1941, concluded that resources from the ‘first resource 
acquisition sphere’ of China, Indochina and Thailand would be insufficient to ‘wage 
a war of endurance’ and that this could only be achieved with the addition of 
resources secured, by force if necessary, from Malaya and Indonesia.119 
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Moreover, Kratoska did ‘not sufficiently analyse the [Japanese] policy making 
process’ which ‘underlay the military administration’.120 As noted by the American 
Institute of Pacific Relations as early as 1932, ‘In the motivation of …policy…the 
leading role has been played by iron and steel’ and ‘[t]o create a national 
independence in these crucial materials has been one of the steady objectives of 
Japanese policy’.121 Given that iron was a coveted commodity before the invasion, it 
did not miraculously diminish in value once the Occupation began. Subsequently 
approved by the Tokyo cabinet, the ‘Outline of Economic Policies for the Southern 
Areas’ of December 1941 stated that: ‘The primary objective shall be to fulfil the 
demand for resources vital to the prosecution of the present war’.  In identifying its 
‘Primary Policies’, the Outline continued that: ‘Emphasis shall be placed on the 
acquisition of resources’.  Ensuring that ‘[e]very effort shall be made to prevent the 
outflow of indigenous resources to the enemy’ was secondary to this principal 
objective.122 In this, ‘Existing mining facilities shall be restored as rapidly as 
possible’.123 Clearly, for the Japanese, the raw materials ‘which the [Southeast Asia] 
region itself offered’ were among its ‘more noteworthy features’.124 Feis’s classic 
study of the origins of the Pacific War stressed how raw materials policy affected 
Japanese plans for war from September 1941. Drawing upon studies made available 
by the American Occupation authorities at the end of World War Two, particularly 
through information gathered from leading army and naval officers, Feis explained 
that:  
The wish to obtain economic reserves for a long war was an important 
factor in determining the spheres to be occupied. It was decided by 
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Imperial Military Headquarters that to be sure of enough oil, rubber, rice, 
bauxite, iron ore, it was necessary to get swift control of Java, Sumatra, 
Borneo, and Malaya.125   
Although Feis’s work was published in 1950, a string of scholarly publications since 
continue to demonstrate the importance of securing raw materials in Japanese 
military planning for the Pacific War.126 Overy, in synthesising this literature, writes 
that Japan’s ‘final acceptance that war with the West was strategically necessary… 
had a clear economic motive… [W]ithout the resources of south-east Asia and facing 
a tighter blockade of vital materials from the US, Japan could not sustain its war 
effort’.127 
 
In this context, the information booklet, Read This Alone – And The War Can Be Won, 
compiled by Imperial Headquarters for the Japanese troops who invaded the Malay 
peninsula, is telling.  Although presaged with pan-Asianist rhetoric, Japan’s 
occupation of Southeast Asia was legitimised by the hard realities of strategic raw 
material exploitation. The region did hold significance as a means of denying rubber, 
tin and tungsten to the ‘unscrupulous’ ‘Anglo-Americans’. But, if Japan could 
‘master’ this area, ‘she [would simultaneously] gain control of the oil and steel that 
she needs for herself’.128 Wartime British intelligence discovered that, ‘The 
programme mapped out for the iron industry in Malaya is perhaps the most 
ambitious of all the Japanese plans for that country’. That included the manufacture 
of pig iron locally to support a local steel industry.129   
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The lack of production of iron ore under the Co-Prosperity Sphere was not, 
moreover, through lack of interest, but insurmountable impediments to extraction 
and export. The ability to fully exploit Malaya was dependent in large measure on 
Japan’s control of the seas (and, to protect shipping, dominance in the sky). In 
December 1941, Tokyo calculated that even Japan’s existing six million tons of 
shipping was ‘barely sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the short war that was 
planned’.130 Japan only succeeded in mastery of the air and sea for a six-month 
period prior to the Battle of Midway in June 1942 (which left the Japanese empire on 
the back foot and marked what Churchill dubbed the ‘turning point in the Pacific 
War’).131 Moreover, the attempt to extend the perimeter of the South Seas Region 
prevented Japan from exploiting the resources of the area already occupied and 
contributed to the subsequent scarcity of shipping which presented an obvious 
barrier to large-scale export.   
 
Japanese administrators interrogated immediately after the Pacific War revealed to 
British Military Administration (BMA) intelligence gatherers that only 104,750 (less 
than one-third) of the 350,000 tons of ore scheduled for export were shipped in the 
year ending March 1943.132 From 1941-5, Japan’s merchant shipping was reduced 
more than four-fold from 6,384,000 to 1,466,900 tons.133 Despite the launching of a 
shipbuilding programme throughout the Southern Regions in 1944, to which 
Malaya’s iron ore would contribute, British intelligence found ‘indications that Japan 
cannot even always move goods of high priority within the Co-prosperity Sphere’. 
By the summer of 1944 there was ‘very little left’ of Malaya’s pre-war trade.134 Not 
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only did the Japanese lack the means to transport the ore to the steel mills, they also 
could not import sufficient plant to develop heavy industries in Malaya to support 
the outer defence of their empire.135 The ‘vicious circle of a shortage of natural 
resources and a military expansion’, was only exacerbated once the Occupation 
began.136 The Japanese resorted to dismantling non-essential railways in Malaya in 
order to plug the deficits in shipping and iron ore.137 Shipping shortages also led to 
an absence of food stuffs. The Japanese miners found it extremely difficult, therefore, 
to maintain a productive workforce.138   
 
Nevertheless, in the invasion’s logistics, the military relied upon knowledge of 
Malaya’s topography and infrastructure, which had been significantly enhanced by 
the presence of Japanese mining technicians and managers from the 1920s. In the 
capture of bridgeheads in east and west Johor at Endau and Batu Pahat during the 
advance down the Malay peninsula (see Figure 2), General Yamashita’s divisions 
were much helped by the port facilities built by the Japanese mines.139  
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Figure 2: Japanese invasion routes, 1941-2 
 
Source: Rouwen Lin, ‘Invasion of Malaya: First shot in the Pacific war’, star2.com, 8 
December 2016, available at: https://www.star2.com/people/2016/12/08/invasion-of-
malaya-the-japanese-arrive/, accessed 16 December 2018.  
  
Colonel Tsuji Masanobu, the strategist who planned the Malayan campaign, recalled 
that ‘from a Japanese resident in Malaya we received aerial photos of Singapore’.140 
32 | P a g e  
 
In the 1930s, Singapore Special Branch called into question the carrying of explosives 
on ISK vessels. An ISK ship’s captain in Singapore was said to have contacts with the 
Kaseda spy ring.  The ISK fleet was allegedly ferrying ‘”safe-hand”covers of political 
interest and possibly receiving and sending wireless messages of a similar kind’. 
There were, additionally, constant visits by agents and employees of ISK ‘whose 
precise business is never made clear and whose coming and goings are largely a law 
unto themselves’.141  
 
In Japan, meanwhile, Ishihara Hirochiro, ISK’s founder and president, regularly 
engaged in expressions of ‘jingo-militarism’ and violently anti-British articles in his 
Osaka-based newspaper and in a book, The Building of New Japan. Ishihara advocated 
Japanese southwards expansionism and pan-Asianism at the expense of what ISK’s 
boss called the ‘anachronistic and effete British Empire’.  Moreover, a new mining 
venture at Kota Tinggi in Johor was suspect in the eyes of the colonial security 
services because it ‘would normally have been dropped by any genuine business 
firm’.142 This view was shared by the Dutch authorities in Indonesia, which cited 
Ishihara’s Nanyo Veem warehousing company as ‘one of the most active mediums 
for espionage’ which imported and stored propaganda materials for the Japanese 
Consulate.143 Moreover, in 1936, Ishihara employed an ex-army officer, Aratame 
Naoji, with a remit to conduct espionage at ISK’s Batavia warehouse.144 The evidence 
against Ishihara makes it ‘unlikely that any other Japanese businessman active in 
Southeast Asia did quite as much to prepare the ground for the foundation of the 
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’.145 NKK in Terengganu, meanwhile, was an 
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integral part of the Nissan group. Nissan was one of the ‘new’ zaibatsu of the inter-
war years which grew exponentially in the 1930s, particularly through connections 
to the munitions industry, to become the third-ranking combine after Mitsubishi and 
Mitsui. Nissan found special favour with the Japanese military in the development 
of heavy industry in Manchuria.146  
 
Before his suicide in 1934 ISK’s managing director had been the head of Singapore’s 
semi-governmental Japanese Association. This ex-pat body had a distinctly 
expansionist flavour. A pre-war colonial police assessment reported that the 
Association saw itself as a ‘self-governing community fighting the economic battle for 
Japanese supremacy in the South Seas’.147 A number of apparently harmless Japanese 
civilians reappeared in military uniforms once the Occupation commenced.148 At the 
least, ‘legitimate organizations and activities’ provided ‘a useful cover for the genuine 
espionage agents who obviously did infiltrate the country’.149 Post-war, it was 
certainly the view of British officials that Japanese mining personnel had ‘suborn[ed] 
local labour forces’ and ‘prepar[ed] the way for the amphibious landings’ on the 
Kelantan coast in December 1941 (see Figure 2).150 Consequently, great lengths were 
taken to prevent the same individuals from resurfacing in post-war Malaya and to 
block ventures which were potential fronts for pre-war businesses. 
 
Post-1945: strategic dilemma to strategic and development imperative 
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Malaya’s iron ore could ‘never again’ be extracted by or for Japanese interests in the 
view of BMA officers in the reoccupation of Malaya in September 1945.151 Anti-
Japanese sentiments in Malaya/Malaysia continued to pervade until the 1970s. Yet, 
within seven years of the end of the Pacific War, Malaya was once again shipping vast 
amounts of iron to Japan as production exceeded one million tons. By 1956, at over 2.4 
million tons, Malaya’s mines exceeded any output figure hit pre-war. With production 
over 6.5 million tons by the early-1960s, the peninsula’s iron outlets were exporting 
more than three times the maximum achieved in the 1930s.152 Japanese investment in 
mining, directly through financing and indirectly through technical assistance and 
equipment, also returned to Malaya. Ultimately there was no room for sentiment in 
shaping raw-materials policy. The story of iron ore in the post-war period illustrates 
striking continuities with the interwar era - the metal’s centrality to the east coast, the 
limits of imperial economic integration, and the impact of geo-political factors in 
shaping Malaya’s economic development. 
 
For British strategists in the initial post-war period, the best-case scenario was a 
sterling-area/Commonwealth outlet, such as Pakistan, for Malaya’s iron ore.153 The 
Japanese mines were taken over by the Custodian of Enemy Property (CEP) and sold 
to non-former-Axis companies.154 As late as September 1951, given a shortage of iron 
ore for the UK steel industry, Sir Edwin Plowden, head of Britain’s Central Economic 
Planning Staff, plus bureaucrats in the UK’s Ministry of Supply, coveted Malayan iron 
ore for the British market.155 This was indicative of a remarkable commitment by the 
Attlee government in London to Empire-Commonwealth sterling-area development 
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as a means of reconstructing and reviving the British economy – a tendency which 
continued into the early years of Churchill’s peacetime administration.156  
 
Malaya, however, remained an ‘unusual and uneconomic’ source of iron ore given the 
high shipping costs to Europe which had weighed against British exploitation of these 
resources pre-war.157 Alternative reserves in Africa and Canada were better located. 
Special and highly secretive permission was given in 1952 to the British Iron & Steel 
Corporation to increase capital in iron-ore mining outside the sterling area in French 
West Africa given the ‘very great importance to the UK economy’. While there was a 
shortage of ore ‘essential for the UK’s iron and steel production’, in the Treasury’s 
view the ‘natural market [for Malaya’s ore] was clearly Japan’.  Alternative markets in 
the US, the UK, India, and Australia were all considered ‘definitely unpromising, 
except for small quantities’.158 Some supplies did reach Britain from Malaya, but this 
was a short-term fix. The Eastern Mining & Metals Company (EMMCO), the 
Australian-Swiss partnership which took over the Bukit Besi mine in 1948, 
endeavoured to sell wherever it could get the best price. By 1953, however, it had only 
sold small quantities of ore to continental Europe, and only one consignment to the 
UK.159 
 
Moreover, by the early-1950s, Anglo-US Cold War imperatives overrode the 
integrated sterling-area ideal. The Asian Cold War became hot with the victory of Mao 
Zedong’s forces in the Chinese civil war by the end of 1949, and the intervention of 
the People’s Republic in Korea during 1950 (plus the beginning of Red Army supplies 
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to the Vietminh). In Washington, it was believed critical that Japan should remain 
within the western camp and be prevented from ‘seeking markets or materials from 
the Communized areas’. If this was not achieved a ‘dangerous dependence’ (notably 
on Mao’s China for iron ore) could ‘expose Japan to successful Communist 
blackmail’.160 As US Secretary of State Dean Acheson argued in 1951, this would give 
the Sino-Soviet bloc the means to ‘significantly’ alter ‘the balance of world power’.161 
In turn, the US would have ‘to spend more and produce more to offset this difference, 
so that it really was to the interest of the US to make it possible for Japan to stay on… 
side’.162Highly dependent upon Washington’s goodwill in the UK’s post-war financial 
crisis, British officials found it difficult to argue against the logic that Japan ‘must re-
emerge as the dynamic hub of commercial activity throughout Asia’.163 Steady 
supplies of Malayan iron ore, particularly, were crucial both for Japan’s reconstruction 
and the production of capital goods which were vital for the country’s future trading 
health.164  
 
In this context, a delegation headed by Kenneth Morrow, senior administrator for 
SCAP’s Economic and Scientific Section, visited Southeast Asia in 1951. The Morrow 
mission’s aim was to ensure access for Japan to the region’s raw materials and its 
markets for trade in manufactures.165 Morrow was particularly interested in Malaya’s 
iron-ore potential given that ‘SCAP sought [Japanese] industrial revival through a 
priority production plan that put the crucial inputs of coal and steel atop a pecking 
order for allocations of materials, capital and imports’. Inter alia, this involved 
government subsidies which ‘massively reduced purchase prices for raw materials 
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and consumed steel’.166 By 1955, Malaya was once again the largest supplier of iron 
ore to Japan. Underwriting this trade, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation (HSBC) learned in 1960 that ‘the projected future of the Japanese steel 
industry was based on a certain amount of ore being brought from Malaya’.167 In 
March 1963, a Japanese steel company director reassured officials and mining 
directors in Kuala Lumpur that ‘Japan believed strongly in Malaya’s iron ore and gave 
it priority’.168  
 
Even so, the British had not been prepared to merely roll over and allow a US-
backed Japanese free-for-all in Malaya. Mindful of public opinion, both in the UK 
and locally in Southeast Asia, the colonial administration used capital controls and 
visa restrictions to allow the gradual reintroduction of Japanese investment and 
personnel into Malaya. This level of scrutiny was made possible by a more 
centralised bureaucracy after 1946; a ‘second colonial occupation’ driven largely by 
the belief that the anarchic, patch-work quilt of pre-war administration had ended in 
the military debacle of 1941-2.  The Malayan Union proved short-lived, given Malay 
protests against the loss of their sultans’ powers.  But, the watered-down Federation 
post-1948 still involved a single government for Malaya as a whole (bar the separate 
crown colony of Singapore).  This permitted overall control of public finances in 
Kuala Lumpur, and an ability to plan for all the Malay states and settlements.169  
 
In facilitating Japan’s reintegration into the Malayan economy, this was not a case of 
Britain caving in to US pressure. Cold War containment dovetailed with a 
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‘development first’ attitude on the part of the colonial administration.170 The backdrop 
was the Emergency, the counter-insurgency war with the MCP, and controlled 
decolonisation which, in tandem with economic development, was supposed to 
anesthetise the Malayan masses against leftist militancy. Once again, iron-ore 
exploitation was seen as crucial for the modernisation of the east coast. For example, 
the opening up of the Rompin deposits was expected to be ‘of [the] greatest 
importance to the economically backward state of Pahang’.171 Though in the FMS 
family before the Second World War, Pahang was a poor relation to Selangor, Negeri 
Sembilan and Perak in terms of its rubber and tin development. Here, the desire to 
exploit economic opportunities intensified as SCAP’s and Japan’s interests elsewhere 
in Asia could potentially shut off markets for Malaya. Chinese raw material exports 
to Japan remained ‘almost at a standstill’ in 1952. The Japanese EXIM Bank in 1953 
was ‘not very hopeful’ of getting Yangtze River or Manchurian supplies, and these 
reserves were ‘very limited’ anyway.172  But the Philippines government had agreed 
in September 1948 to supply 200,000 tons of iron ore annually to Japan in exchange for 
industrial goods. This quantity rapidly increased so that Japanese mining and steel 
interests expected to import 1.5 million tons from the Philippines for 1953 (as against 
Malaya’s contracted 850,000 tons). India’s and Portuguese Goa’s iron ore-exports were 
also on the rise: together they supplied 370,000 tons to Japan in 1951, and, for 1953, 
India agreed to deliver 300,000 tons and Goa ½ million.173 
 
In repetition of the 1930s, the revival of iron mining offered employment possibilities.  
But, whereas the Japanese-owned mines had ordinarily relied upon Chinese and 
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Indian immigrant labour, jobs were reserved post-war for the economically-
marginalised indigenous Malay community. The Japanese miners did employ large 
number of Malays by 1941 but that was largely through necessity as the Sino-Japanese 
conflict made Chinese labour unreliable. EMMCO’s Australian owners, however, 
made a virtue of their positive discrimination in favour of Malays. Employing about 
3000 indigenes by 1953, EMMCO at Bukit Besi was one of the highest employers of 
Malay labour outside government, and this extended to executive posts.174At 
Temangan, a British investment group won support from Kelantan’s Malay Chief 
Minister through emphasising that his mining subsidiary ‘would be employing 
considerable numbers of local labour’. The 15-year concession awarded in 1956 
required the Oriental Mining Company to train Kelantanese personnel to replace 
Japanese in supervisory posts, and to provide a scholarship for a local Malay.175   
 
The annual Bukit Besi payroll in the 1950s amounted to M$3 million. EMMCO’s 
Rompin mine, primarily utilising Malay labour, would become one of the largest 
single employers in the peninsula when it finally opened for business in 1962. As in 
the era of Japanese ownership, the iron-mining towns were self-sufficient enclaves of 
modernity equipped with shops and markets, schools, hospitals and leisure facilities 
such as bars and swimming pools.176 Moreover, the iron mines were significant 
contributors to the public purses of the cash strapped east-coast states. The Japanese 
iron mission to the Federation in 1963 claimed that Malaya’s export duties were 
‘among the highest in the world’.177 Under the federal arrangements after 1948 
royalties were converted into export duties. Strictly speaking, these revenues should 
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have accrued to the central coffer in Kuala Lumpur.  But a special concession allowed 
for the states to be the prime beneficiaries, especially where Terengganu represented 
‘one of the biggest difficulties’.178  
 
Export duties from mining accounted for more than half Terengganu’s locally raised 
income by 1954.179 The federal chest was also topped up through the payment of M$6 
million in income tax from EMMCO between 1948 and 1953 alone. EMMCO’s 
exploitation clearly fulfilled the administration’s hunger for ‘obtaining revenue not 
only from a fair rate of Export Duty but also from the Income Tax on the profits’.180 
Concurrently, iron-ore exploitation broadened out the Malayan economy, which was 
still regarded as dangerously dependent upon rubber and tin and which, with the end 
of the Korean war boom, was more exposed than ever (especially as high prices had 
stimulated synthetic rubber production and substitution and conservation techniques 
for tin).181  
 
Despite the obvious boon to the local economy and the concomitant benefit of 
winning hearts and minds, the British were determined to prevent a return to 
Japanese dominance of Malayan iron mining. For example, in 1948 the Nippon 
Mining Company offered to place itself at the disposal of the colonial administration, 
and to ‘undertake any task’ which it might ‘deign to assign’.182 The UK Liaison 
Mission in Tokyo regarded this ‘generous’ offer as a desire by NKK to ‘gradually 
infiltrate back into Malaya’. Nevertheless, it was believed that the risk could be 
managed to secure NKK’s expertise and ensure ‘the use by Japan of [Malayan] iron 
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ore in preference to that from other sources’.183 The authorities in Kuala Lumpur 
were alive to the ‘defence point of view’ but believed a small group of Japanese 
engineers, familiar with the ore and with the Japanese steel giants that had used it 
before the war, could be let in on a short-term basis to revive Bukit Besi.184 The CEP 
in Kuala Lumpur painstakingly scrutinised applications for mining leases to ensure 
that the applicants were not cloaking investments by Japanese financial or mining 
concerns.  For example, at Temangan, the ambitions of an ‘American’ firm registered 
in Panama, Metal Exports, Inc., were blocked when it became clear that this was 
merely a ‘front’ for the re-entry of the pre-war Kokan Kogyo. The application for 
renewal of title was refused.185  
 
In the post-war strategic dilemma there remained a concern in British official 
thinking not to antagonise Japan, especially as the country regained its sovereignty 
at the end of the US-led occupation in 1952. ‘What we must avoid’, diplomatic staff 
in Tokyo advised, was to ‘lay ourselves open to the pre-war Japanese propaganda 
charge that the West had monopolised the resources of Asia’.186 On the spot in 
Malaya, however, the strategic threat by the early-1950s was no longer Japanese 
militarism but commercial control. From April 1952, following the signing of the San 
Francisco peace treaty, inspectors of mines were warned to keep a ‘wary eye on 
anything which either appears to smack of Japanese infiltration or any other 
activities which may provide a cover for it’. Transfers of leases to foreign companies 
should be ‘scrutinised’. It was feared that Japanese businesses would work through 
nominees in the disposal of former enemy properties. These might be bought by 
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speculators with the intention of selling them on to Japanese interests when 
opportunities arose. A return to a Japanese monopoly of iron-ore production, as 
Malaya moved towards self-government, would allow the ‘Japanese steel masters’ to 
depress prices.187  
 
A revised Kokan scheme, which proposed a partnership between the Japanese 
company and local Malayan interests, also failed to assure British officials who 
regarded the joint enterprise as ‘window-dressing for a purely Japanese control on 
Temangan’s production and export, and the mine as a reserved market for Japanese 
machinery exports’.188 Hence, Kokan’s president and Japan’s Consul-General for 
Malaya were informed in July 1953 that any re-development of the Temangan mine 
would require a 51 per cent Malayan/British interest. The colonial administration 
and the British Embassy in Tokyo sought out ‘highly reputable’ British firms to lead 
the Temangan project, settling upon the agency house, Boustead & Co., and the 
shipping company, Andrew Weir.  A combination of Weir and Boustead with 
Japanese interests ‘would make a good pis aller for sterling capital control’.189 
Boustead/Weir held 51 per cent of the capital in the deal struck in 1954; Kokan took 
39 per cent, after the Japanese share was further diluted through the Kelantan state 
government being allocated 10 per cent of Oriental Mining’s equity. Strict visa 
controls would also limit the Japanese personnel at Temangan to about 30, and the 
company was advised that it was in its interest ‘to employ as few non-Malays as 
possible’.190 Such concerns continued into the post-independence era. The Federal 
Treasury suggested in the case of an iron-ore concession in Perak that the following 
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clause be inserted in the contract: ‘The Lessee shall not Assign, Transfer, or Sub-
lease, the whole or any part of the lands hereby leased without first obtaining the 
written consent of the Ruler in Council’.191  
 
The need to ensure the export of Malayan iron ore to Japan while simultaneously 
preventing Japanese economic dominance of the industry was a delicate balancing act. 
Hence, EMMCO’s plans for Rompin through raising the bulk of its finance from 
American and/or Japanese government-linked banks was blocked by the Treasury in 
London, fearing a puncturing of Malaya’s position as the prize-winning dollar earner 
of the sterling area or a default by EMMCO resulting in the mines being taken over by 
the company’s Japanese creditors.192 Fortunately, for EMMCO, HSBC was in the 
wings to pick up the tab at Rompin (as the premiere colonial bank had been for the 
rebuild and upgrade of Bukit Besi).193 Nevertheless, a barter deal, whereby US$10 
million worth of Japanese steel, plant and equipment would be swapped for Malayan 
ore through deductions from the proceeds of its sale, was reluctantly tolerated by the 
Treasury and the Bank of England (even though this might lead to the Japanese steel 
mills paying less-than-market prices for their raw-material supplies).194 Such, 
however, were the ‘impressive strategic arguments’ and the ‘prospective benefits to 
[Malaya’s] development’.195Malayan iron ore was the dream ticket: it fulfilled the 
development priorities of the colonial administration, while simultaneously meeting 
the broader Cold-War objective of facilitating Japanese reconstruction. Iron ore 
continued to be of considerable significance for Malaya/Malaysia’s post-colonial 
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economy with over 55 million tons of iron ore produced in the country’s first decade 
of independence to 1967 with an export value of M$1.392 billion.196  
 
Conclusion: threats versus opportunities 
 
Iron ore was of far more importance to Malaya’s twentieth-century economy, and 
the underdeveloped east-coast states especially, than existing studies acknowledge. 
Income from leases and export duties, as well as employment prospects and 
infrastructure development, made the exploitation of iron-ore mining a major 
enterprise. The giant mines at Bukit Besi and Rompin constituted the largest iron-
mining complex in Asia during the 1950s and 1960s, representing two of the largest 
and most profitable industrial enterprises in Malaya/Malaysia.197 Reliable sales of 
iron ore had the additional benefit of smoothing out fluctuations in the volatile 
prices of tin and rubber.198 Added value came from iron ore’s role as a strategic 
metal. Malaya became a geo-political concern at the heart of Japanese designs in the 
run up to the Pacific War. Iron ore was vital to Japan’s industrial development and 
its war machine.  By the 1930s, this raised potential dangers for Britain in its 
decisions to either supply or deny. The strategic dilemma continued into the post-
war era as the colonial administration battled with inclinations to prevent the return 
of Japanese investments to Malaya while, at the same time, faced its own struggle 
against communist insurgents and the broader exigent demands of the Cold War. By 
1948, US Occupation policy in Japan identified reconstruction as the mechanism to 
ensure Japan’s role as the ‘anti-Communist bulwark and economic hub of the Far 
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East’.199 This ‘reverse course’, combined with President Truman’s desire to reduce 
US overseas expenditure, dictated that Japan once again be given access to markets 
and raw materials in Southeast Asia.  For Britain, this meant Malaya’s iron mines, 
whose exports became a key commodity in containment.  
 
Angst notwithstanding, Japanese interests in Malayan iron ore dovetailed with 
British interests for the development of the UMS in the inter-war years.  In the post-
war period, the ‘development first’ attitude of the colonial administration chimed 
with a need to provide greater security to Southeast Asia via Japanese trade. In this 
way, British dilemmas were either overcome or set aside in light of international 
geo-political imperatives and local economic opportunity.   
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